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This paper evaluates the existing policy frameworks for mitigation of diffuse water pollution from 26 
agriculture (DWPA) in England and China. With reference to a conceptual model of the process of 27 
policy transfer or international lesson drawing, and possible constraints to this, it assesses whether 28 
and how China can draw lessons to improve current policy from the supra-national and national 29 
provisions of the EU and a member state that by 2016 had comprehensively implemented EU 30 
agricultural and environmental policy. DWPA is first analysed as a public policy challenge to inform 31 
specification of a generic framework for its mitigation. The current policy frameworks for mitigation 32 
of DWPA in England and China are evaluated, and their potential for improvement is assessed. A 33 
number of barriers to lesson drawing for regulation, incentive payments schemes and advice 34 
provision are diagnosed. These barriers are potentially least in relation to advice provision and its 35 
use to promote voluntary action by farmers. Given its structure and capabilities the public 36 
agricultural extension system in China is also recognised as a key resource. A focus on three 37 
policy approaches to mitigate DWPA in China is recommended: i) targeted regulation to a 38 
‘reference level’ of large intensive livestock, and ultimately other large commercial farms; ii) 39 
strategic use of incentive payment schemes to protect water resources from DWPA; and iii) re-40 
orientation of the ethos and modalities of operation of the extension system, informed by 41 
international lesson drawing, with the aim of rebalancing farm productivity and environmental 42 
protection. 43 
 44 
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1. Introduction 47 
 48 
Water pollution from agriculture and its consequences are a source of increasing concern 49 
(Vorosmarty et al., 2010). In England the leading pollutants from agriculture and wastewater are 50 
sediment, chemicals, nitrate and phosphorus (Gov.UK, 2016a). Projected improvement in 51 
compliance with European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD; CED, 2000) standards 52 
for ‘good status’ seem modest in rising from only 17% of all waterbodies in 2015 to 25% in 2021, 53 
but physical modifications of waterbodies are a common reason for ‘failure’. In contrast, 82-88% of 54 
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the chemical and biological parameters monitored should be at ‘good status’ or better in all areas 55 
by 2021 (Gov.UK, 2016a). In China water pollution remains severe with more than 61% of 56 
groundwater and 28% of surface waters in the main river basins classified as unfit for human use 57 
or contact (China Water Risk, 2015). Agriculture is a major cause, estimated to be the source for 58 
57% of the nitrogen and 69% of the phosphorus entering Chinese watercourses (MEP, 2010). 59 
 60 
Point source1 water pollution can be mitigated by pre-discharge treatment of wastewater subject to 61 
the right regulation, technology, and political will (Smith et al., 2015a). When control has been at 62 
least partially achieved policy emphasis shifts to diffuse pollution for which agriculture is a 63 
significant source. However, diffuse water pollution is more difficult to mitigate as it consists of the 64 
releases of diverse pollutants from dispersed sources across the landscape including run off and 65 
leaching from fields and farmyards.  66 
 67 
The challenges and conditions for agriculture and water resource management in China are unique 68 
and there is no ‘model country’ to provide a reference point for policy solutions; however, large 69 
federal countries such as the United States and Australia, and supra-national bodies such as the 70 
European Union can provide applicable lessons (World Bank, 2006), subject to analysis of how 71 
these might transfer with appropriate modification. Such detailed analysis is lacking in relation to 72 
DWPA. In 2016, England (as part of the UK) is representative of an EU member state that has 73 
comprehensively implemented EU agricultural and environmental policy2. This paper evaluates the 74 
policy framework for mitigation of DWPA in such an EU member state in comparison to that in 75 
China; providing an original assessment of the potential for international lesson drawing3.  76 
 77 
The assessment proceeds by first adopting a conceptual model for the process of lesson drawing 78 
and identification of constraints to this. It then analyses the policy challenge of DWPA to derive a 79 
generic framework for its mitigation. The characterisation and validity of this framework is further 80 
established by evaluation of policy in England (supported by other OECD country examples) and 81 
equivalent policy in China. The conceptual model for policy transfer is then applied to review the 82 
potential for an improved policy framework in China and conclusions are drawn. 83 
 84 
2. Methods and materials   85 
 86 
Preparation of this paper employed review and analysis of literature and secondary data. This was 87 
supplemented by semi-structured interviews with key informants in England and China, field visits 88 
to four farming systems in China, and workshops with stakeholders in each of those locations, and 89 
with national stakeholders in Beijing. The local workshops were attended by community leaders, 90 
farmers, large farm managers, local researchers and government officers, including 91 
representatives of the public agricultural extension service (PAES) at administrative levels from 92 
village to county and city. The workshops were part of a wider project investigating nutrient 93 
management in Chinese agriculture and associated risks of DWPA. The farming systems visited in 94 
China were: rice-wheat farms near Lake Tai in Jiangsu Province; maize-wheat farms in Huantai 95 
County, Shandong Province; solar greenhouses for horticultural crops near Yangling, Shaanxi 96 
Province; and kiwi fruit and maize growers in Zhouzhi, Shaanxi Province. 97 
 98 
3. A conceptual model for lesson drawing  99 
 100 
The concept of lesson drawing or policy transfer is a domain of public policy analysis (e.g. Dolowitz 101 
and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011). It can be understood as the 102 
                                                 
1 A discrete and discernible source of wastewater such as pipes, ditches and channels. 
2 Noting that the UK referendum result of 23rd June 2016 prompts UK withdrawal from the EU. This paper 
focuses on England rather than the UK because of differences in policy in Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland.  
3 The bilateral research and knowledge exchange for this paper can be seen as a part of the ‘soft’ policy 
transfer (see definition below) conducted by the Sustainable Agricultural Innovation Network (SAIN, 2016) 
and inspired by common challenges, needs and aspirations for sustainable agriculture in the UK and China. 
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process through which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in one 103 
jurisdiction can be used in the development of similar features in another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 104 
2000). As in Figure 1 and Table 1, the process of lesson drawing can be analysed in stages 105 
(Benson, 2009; Rose, 2005). Figure 1 infers possible constraints to the transferability of lessons, 106 
which are identified and posed as questions and indicators in Table 1. Many of the constraints are 107 
associated with ‘hard’ policy transfer, i.e. adoption by the public sector based on formalised peer-108 
to-peer information exchange (Benson, 2009). This contrasts to ‘soft’ transfers occurring flexibly via 109 
exchange of norms, knowledge and techniques by a diverse range of actors and processes. The 110 
latter may be less constrained but typically more concerned with how best to implement a given 111 
policy or programme than its functional objective (Benson, 2009).  112 
 113 
position - Figure 1: Stages of lesson drawing. 114 
Source: Benson, 2009. 115 
 116 
position - Table 1: Constraints to lesson drawing  117 
Source: adapted from Benson 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000. 118 
 119 
4. The policy challenge of diffuse water pollution from agriculture  120 
 121 
As a ‘market-failure’ displaying public good and externality properties DWPA is challenging for 122 
public policy (Weersink and Livernois, 1996; Smith and Porter, 2010; OECD, 2012). Bio-physical 123 
uncertainties and the temporal and spatial characteristics of DWPA render a solely regulatory 124 
approach costly if not impractical (OECD, 2012; Smith et al., 2015a). Complexity is exacerbated by 125 
the multi-functionality of land use, its delivery of both complementary and competing ecosystem 126 
services, and the relevant property rights of society and land owners. This applies to the activity 127 
that generates DWPA but also to some of its mitigation measures. For example, riparian buffer 128 
zones can limit pollutant runoff but also provide amenity, habitat and carbon sequestration. 129 
Furthermore, today’s pollution is in large part a legacy of past farming practice, and change in 130 
practice today may not fully deliver its benefits for decades to come (Powers, et al., 2016). 131 
Consequently how all costs and benefits from agriculture and DWPA mitigation are distributed is a 132 
matter for socio-political determination. Deliberation on this is best decentralised to the level 133 
appropriate to account for existing relevant responsibilities and local specificities (Smith et al., 134 
2015a). 135 
 136 
5. A mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture  137 
 138 
5.1 A common framework 139 
 140 
Given the characteristics of DWPA (Section 4) a range of policies for its mitigation must be 141 
considered. Regulation of farming practice can be complemented by economic incentives, 142 
provision of advice to promote voluntary action and self-regulation, and at the margin acquisition of 143 
land or control of its use (Weersink and Livernois, 1996; Shortle and Horan, 2001; Mauerhofer et 144 
al. 2013). An appropriately sequenced policy mix is likely to outperform a single instrument such as 145 
a pollution tax, especially where multiple barriers to farmer adoption of DWPA mitigation measures 146 
exist (OECD, 2012). Such barriers exist in China as identified by Smith and Siciliano, 2015. There 147 
needs to be emphasis on changing the behaviour of not only farmers but also all other 148 
stakeholders. A national approach is needed that addresses all polluters without singling out 149 
farmers. Government agencies, civil society organisations and private businesses must all take 150 
actions at scales from sub-catchments to national and transboundary (OECD, 2012). A well 151 
designed policy mix for mitigation of DWPA will facilitate coordination of actions. It must also be 152 
supported by adequate scientific understanding and evidence. We term this mixed approach, 153 
including the knowledge base that supports it, the ‘mitigation framework for DWPA’ (Smith and 154 





position - Figure 2: A mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture  158 
Source:  159 
 160 
Figure 2 depicts a layered approach of complementary policies. This corresponds to current 161 
provision in England as considered in Section 6, whilst other EU and OECD countries including 162 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada also employ a regulatory approach complemented by advice, 163 
voluntary action and targeted incentives (OECD, 2010). First, enforceable regulations applied 164 
widely aim to achieve a baseline of environmental protection. This equates to the ‘reference level’ 165 
(Scheele, 1999) that divides environmental standards that farmers are expected to meet at their 166 
own cost from higher standards for which society is willing to provide remuneration (or at least 167 
compensation for income foregone). Meeting standards at the ‘reference level’ should become a 168 
‘compliance condition’ to receive such remuneration (Weersink and Livernois, 1996). In 169 
increasingly targeted layers, regulations to protect water resources can then be complemented by 170 
voluntary action and incentives. Provision of advice is ‘cross-cutting’ as it can facilitate compliance 171 
with regulation and adoption of voluntary and incentivised measures. The national knowledge base 172 
is similarly an essential supporting resource, providing policy makers and farm advisors with 173 
information on the outcomes of DWPA mitigation measures, costs and farmer responses. 174 
 175 
5.2 Other policies 176 
 177 
5.2.1 Water quality trading 178 
 179 
The mitigation framework in Figure 2 is not exclusive of other policy options. For example, water 180 
quality trading (WQT) schemes as a form of emissions trading (OECD, 2012) could be an 181 
alternative or complement to incentive payments. ‘Cap and trade’ schemes have the potential to 182 
limit emissions at lowest net cost to society (Choi, 2006) but are institutionally demanding for 183 
mitigation of DWPA as they require: binding regulatory limits on pollution levels; sufficient variation 184 
in pollution control costs between farms to make gains from trading possible net of transactions 185 
costs; trading rules that are simple and minimise transaction costs; and a trusted intermediary to 186 
facilitate trading (adapted from OECD, 2012). They also require the measurement of emissions, 187 
inputs or change in environmental conditions (Choi, 2006). Consequently, almost all WQT 188 
schemes are only partially capped4 (OECD, 2012). A typical scenario is that point source polluters 189 
buy pollution reductions to achieve their regulatory compliance in the form of input use reductions 190 
made voluntarily by farms. DWPA can thus be profitably reduced by the farmer but is not capped. 191 
 192 
Water quality may also benefit from schemes such as ‘wetland banking’. In the USA under the 193 
Clean Water Act (Section 4.4) conversion of wetlands to other uses is capped to “no net loss” so 194 
that any loss must be compensated by provision of new wetlands or enhancement of existing sites. 195 
‘Wetlands banks’ can create wetlands in multiple locations and sell ‘wetland credits’ to property 196 
developers to offset wetland loss (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). 197 
 198 
5.2.2 Pollution taxes 199 
 200 
A tax on emissions would best apply the polluter-pays principle to change behaviour, but given the 201 
costs of monitoring DWPA the ‘second-best’ policy of a tax on the inputs that cause emissions is 202 
usually a default (Lally et al, 2007). Examples include pesticide taxes in Denmark, France, Italy, 203 
Norway and Sweden and fertiliser taxes in Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden and USA (OECD, 204 
2012). Inelastic demand for farm inputs, swapping of pollutants or pollution pathways as farming 205 
systems change, international trade competitiveness, equity for farmers already compliant with 206 
regulated input use levels and political resistance from farmers are all issues that may limit 207 
application of this policy. However, there is evidence that sufficiently high tax levels supported by 208 
farm advice can achieve reductions in input use without loss of farm production (OECD, 2012). 209 
                                                 
4 Input (nitrogen) trading within a cap between farmers in the Lake Taupo catchment, New Zealand provides an 




5.2.3 Reduction of perverse incentives from agricultural support policies 211 
 212 
An alternative approach to mitigation of DWPA is to remove or reduce the effect of policies that 213 
raise producer prices, subsidise use of polluting inputs or by other means encourage intensive 214 
farming. Such policies neglect variation in landscapes and may drive intensification poorly matched 215 
to environmental capacity to mitigate and absorb pollution (OECD, 2012). 216 
 217 
6. The mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture in England 218 
 219 
6.1 Regulation 220 
 221 
In England relevant regulation relates mainly to the use (storage, handling and application) of 222 
agricultural inputs (pesticides, inorganic fertilisers and manures) with the potential for negative 223 
environmental impacts. Regulations are numerous and detailed. The EU Nitrates Directive (CEC, 224 
1991) as transposed into national legislation can be cited as a leading example. Areas where 225 
nitrate levels in water exceed, or are at risk of exceeding 50 mg per litre, and/or are eutrophic, are 226 
designated as Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) within which farmers are required to implement 227 
measures designed to reduce and/or prevent nitrate loss to water through leaching or run-off. Farm 228 
inspections are carried out to ensure compliance with standards that include nitrate application 229 
levels, timing of applications and adequacy of fertiliser storage.  230 
 231 
6.2 Voluntary action 232 
 233 
Some measures to mitigate DWPA may be adopted by farmers out of altruistic concern for 234 
environmental quality, but for most adoption is motivated by cost or time savings from improved 235 
practice. In England government agencies have advised farmers and partnered industry-led 236 
voluntary initiatives5 to implement environmental protection measures. Voluntary action by farmers 237 
is also motivated by the advice and technical assistance provided by non-government 238 
organisations (NGOs). Foremost in this are registered charities, including rivers trusts, wildlife 239 
trusts and other farm advisory groups6, that source funding from governmental (UK and EU) and 240 
private sources. They generally seek to develop and encourage farmer adoption of ‘win-win’ 241 
solutions of management improvements, cost savings and environmental protection. Examples of 242 
measures include fencing of streams, clean and dirty water separation in farmyards, and re-243 
location of feeders, tracks and gateways. Many farmers/farm managers are also highly trained and 244 
experienced, particularly for larger commercial operations, and seen as part of agricultural 245 
knowledge and information systems (AKIS7) are capable of innovating cost saving and 246 
environmentally beneficial practices.  247 
 248 
6.3 Incentive payments 249 
 250 
Incentive payments can take a variety of forms, but in general provide incentive (or compensation) 251 
for change in farm input use, management practice or land use that mitigates DWPA. Farmers in 252 
England can participate in a variety of schemes. Most participate in the Basic Payments Scheme 253 
(BPS) funded under the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This provides an annual per 254 
hectare (ha) subsidy aimed to support farm incomes and maintain agricultural productivity. To 255 
receive the payment farmers must comply with ‘Statutory Management Requirements’ (SMRs) and 256 
‘Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions’ (GAECs) that relate to public, animal and plant 257 
                                                 
5 Three leading examples are: the Campaign for the Farmed Environment (CFE), the Voluntary Initiative (VI), 
and the Tried & Tested initiative. 
6 For example, LEAF (Linking Environment and Farming).   
7 Defined as the organizations, institutions and actors that generate and exchange information to enhance 




health, environment, climate change, good agricultural condition of land and animal welfare (Defra, 258 
2016). Known as cross-compliance, this includes a set of basic measures to protect watercourses 259 
and groundwater against pollution, soil erosion and over abstraction8. Farmers have incentive to 260 
adopt these measures as failure to do so can result in loss of some or all of the BPS payment 261 
(though this is subject to the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement).  262 
 263 
Many farmers can also access payments under the rural development policy of the CAP. In 264 
England payments are offered by the Countryside Stewardship (CS) scheme9. This incentivizes 265 
farmers to adopt measures and provide environmental goods beyond those required by the cross-266 
compliance and greening rules8. Unlike its predecessor schemes9 most options in the CS scheme 267 
are competitive. Targeting and scoring of applications from farmers aims to encourage applications 268 
well-matched to local environmental priorities10 (NE, 2015). The overarching scheme priority “is to 269 
protect and enhance the natural environment, in particular the diversity of wildlife (biodiversity) and 270 
water quality” (NE, 2015, pp. 3). Provision is made for: ‘Mid-Tier’ multi-year agreements for widely 271 
applicable environmental improvements including management options and capital grants; ‘Higher 272 
Tier’ more targeted multi-year agreements for environmentally significant sites, commons and 273 
woodlands requiring complex management; and ‘Capital Grants’ for hedgerows and boundaries, 274 
improving water quality, developing implementation plans, feasibility studies, and woodland 275 
creation and improvement (NE, 2015). The ‘Mid-Tier’ includes the specific aim to reduce DWPA 276 
and applicants can select from a number of relevant management options, plus items eligible for 277 
capital grants11.  278 
 279 
Aside from publicly funded schemes, UK policy makers have encouraged12 the private sector to 280 
invest in water resource protection through payments for ecosystem services (PES)13. The leading 281 
examples to date are investment by water companies in farm management measures that enhance 282 
water retention in uplands and protection of water quality in drinking water source areas14. 283 
Investments are motivated by ability to demonstrate value for water customers and shareholders. 284 
Such initiatives were only recently facilitated by reforms by the water industry regulator that permit 285 
water company investments on land owned by private landowners and investment appraisal over a 286 
sufficiently long time horizon to capture benefits (compared for example to investment in water 287 
treatment solutions). Beyond water companies, significant PES investment by the private sector is 288 
likely to remain limited without further reform of relevant fiscal and regulatory frameworks to 289 
provide the necessary commercial incentives. 290 
 291 
                                                 
8 Since 2015, farmers with land above set thresholds also have to meet ‘greening’ rules to receive a 
‘greening payment’ making up about 30% of their total BPS payment. Requirements for this make little direct 
provision for water resource protection, although riparian buffer strips can qualify under a requirement for 
ecological focus areas (EFAs); e.g. buffer strips, catch crops, cover crops, fallow land, hedges and nitrogen-
fixing crops (RPA, 2016). 
9 This superceded three previous schemes from January 2016: the Environmental Stewardship scheme; the 
English Woodland Grant Scheme; and capital grants from the Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF) 
programme. CSF is a project run by Natural England in partnership with the Environment Agency and the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. It raises awareness of DWPA by giving free training 
and advice to farmers in selected priority catchments in England. Grants were also provided for a variety of 
works including infrastructure for clean and dirty water separation, track maintenance, watercourse fencing, 
roofing of manure storage and resurfacing of gateways. 
10 As set out in regional statements of priorities (Gov.UK, 2016b). 
11 ‘Water quality grants’ are only available in priority catchments identified in the CSFprogramme. 
12 Publication of Smith et al., 2013, provides an example. 
13 Wunder (2008, pp. 835) defines PES as “(a) a voluntary transaction where (b) a well-defined 
environmental service (ES) or a land use likely to secure that service (c) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum 
one) service buyer (d) from a (minimum one) service provider (e) if and only if the service provider secures 
service provision (conditionality)”.   
14 E.g. Upstream Thinking (2016).  
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Incentive payments to farmers in England have usually been based on individual contracts, 292 
whereas payments to communities or groups of farmers could help ensure that individual actions 293 
best complement the actions of others in production of ecosystem services at a necessary scale, 294 
for example, comprehensive water quality protection throughout a hydrological sub-catchment. 295 
Such environmental stewardship as a community rather than individual responsibility may also 296 
promote advantageous social learning, self-monitoring and regulation, and partnership working. In 297 
England a small number of multi-actor agreements have been in place15, for example, to manage 298 
overgrazing on moorland in South West England. Here farmers formed a limited company which 299 
receives funds for distribution to members and assumes responsibility to ensure members adhere 300 
to the environmental management requirements of the agreement. Such examples remain rare. 301 
They can incur considerable time and transaction costs to set up and may require additional 302 
incentives for farmers (premium payments or threat of regulatory control), as UK farmers do not 303 
generally have experience of such collaboration.     304 
 305 
6.4 Advice provision 306 
 307 
Since the mid-1980s production oriented farm management advice has been treated by successive 308 
governments as a private good to be provided by competitive commercial suppliers (Garforth et al., 309 
2003). State funded farm advice originally focused on farm productivity but has increasingly 310 
adopted an environmental protection agenda. Public provision in England now takes the form of 311 
the Farming Advice Service (FAS) which is delivered by a network of contracted independent 312 
advisors. It provides advice on the BPS, cross-compliance and ‘greening requirements’, other 313 
environmental regulations, nutrient management and climate change adaptation and mitigation. 314 
Advice is delivered via on-line information, articles in the farming press, workshops, farm walks and 315 
drop-in-clinics (Gov.UK, 2016c). The CSF9 programme has primarily distributed grants for on-farm 316 
capital works that protect water resources but CSF advisors also provide farmers with pollution 317 
mitigation advice in 77 priority catchments. 318 
 319 
A range of private and civil society organisations also provide advice, and both FAS and CSF work 320 
in partnership with other voluntary initiatives such as the CFE5, and organisations such as the 321 
National Farmers Union, Country Land and Business Association, Agricultural Industries 322 
Confederation (AIC) and rivers and wildlife trusts. In England agricultural knowledge and 323 
information systems can thus be characterised as highly diverse and decentralised. There are at 324 
least 80 sources of advice to land managers (Defra, 2013a, p.4; Prager and Thompson, 2014, p.8) 325 
from “at least 14 different types of actor” (Curry et al., 2012, p.244). However, it is a subset of 326 
these led by CSF and rivers trusts that possesses most in-depth expertise related to DWPA. The 327 
AIC and its Fertiliser Advisers Certification & Training Scheme (FACTS) are also notable. This 328 
voluntary scheme sets standards, provides training and accredits advisers who provide nutrient 329 
management advice. Growth to over 2500 qualified advisers in the UK demonstrates demand by 330 
farmers for reliable advice to optimise crop nutrition whilst protecting soil, water, air and biodiversity 331 
(BASIS, 2016). 332 
 333 
6.5 Knowledge base 334 
 335 
For farm typologies in England there is a body of evidence for the effectiveness of DWPA 336 
mitigation measures at a field scale (Newell Price et al., 201116; Cuttle, et al., 2016). Although this 337 
could be further improved (Randall, et al., 2015; Holden, et al., 2016), it is informing 338 
implementation of the national mitigation framework. Knowledge of catchment scale responses to 339 
mitigation measures is subject to greater uncertainty. On-going research through ‘demonstration 340 
test catchments’ is addressing this (McGonigle, et al., 2014), and novel spatial environmental 341 
science and modelling approaches are being used to assess pollution risks, pressures and 342 
                                                 
15 Formed under the Environmental Stewardship scheme prior to 2016. 
16 An inventory of methods and user guide for selection of farm-level mitigation options to reduce DWPA, air 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. 
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mitigation strategies at a catchment scale (Holden, et al., 2016). Guidance and case studies have 343 
also been compiled to assist development of PES-based schemes (e.g. Smith et al., 2013). 344 
 345 
6.6 Other policies 346 
 347 
WQT schemes and pollution taxes are not active policies for DWPA mitigation in England. With 348 
regard to perverse incentives, the BPS is ‘decoupled’ from production incentives though it can be 349 
argued that any farm income support is fungible and may still contribute to intensification. 350 
However, it has also been directly observed by the authors that financially marginal and under-351 
capitalised farms are often among the worst polluters; at least in the dairy sector. 352 
 353 
6.7 Evaluating the effectiveness of the mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from 354 
agriculture in England: synergies, conflicts, deficiencies and collective action 355 
 356 
The responsible authorities are deliberately parsimonious in enforcement of farm regulation, 357 
stemming from caution given the evidential costs of legal prosecution and a lack of political support 358 
for a ‘heavy-handed’ approach (key informants). In 2012, the National Audit Office concluded that 359 
the inspection regime by multiple agencies was lacking in coordination and burdensome for 360 
compliant farmers. Their evaluation was hindered by the lack of coordinated monitoring across 361 
inspections and outcomes, but it was concluded that the regime was not cost effective or ‘value for 362 
money’ (NAO, 2012). Table 2 summarises farm inspections relevant to Figure 2 and Section 6. 363 
Only a small proportion of farms are likely to receive such inspections17 (NAO, 2012). It can be 364 
concluded that the effectiveness of regulation to ensure the ‘reference level’ (Figure 2) for 365 
mitigation of DWPA can be improved.  366 
 367 
position -Table 2: Farm inspections in England relevant to mitigation of diffuse water 368 
pollution from agriculture, 2011-2012 369 
Source: Defra, 2013b 370 
 371 
Defra is seeking to improve data sharing and coordination of farm inspections between its 372 
agencies (Defra, 2013b). An ‘earned recognition approach’ (Table 2) also aims to reduce 373 
inspection burdens for compliant farmers recognised as ‘low risk businesses’ from their record of 374 
inspections and their participation in voluntary assurance schemes. Approximately 40% of farmers 375 
receive inspections to qualify for membership of non-government food standard and supply chain 376 
assurance schemes (NAO, 2012). Defra thus expects to improve targeting of its agencies’ 377 
inspections to those farms where the risks of non-compliance are highest. 378 
 379 
Evidence for the effectiveness of voluntary action by farmers to mitigate DWPA is lacking as NGOs 380 
(and government agencies) typically lack resources for evaluation studies (or prefer to prioritise 381 
expenditure on actions). However, the available evidence is largely positive. A leading example is 382 
provided by the Cornwall Rivers Project (CRP). Implemented by the Westcountry Rivers Trust 383 
(WRT) from 2002 to 2006 at a cost of £2.6 million this project provided ‘tailored’ advice to 870 384 
farms covering over 56,000 ha and 1,380km of watercourses. An independent economic survey 385 
reported average annual cost savings per farm from measures that mitigate DWPA of over £1360, 386 
achieving ‘payback’ for the project in less than 3 years (WRT, 2006). Further to this, in England 387 
268,500 ha of voluntary environmental land management (i.e. not incentivised by payments) were 388 
achieved in 2015 (Defra, 2015a); equivalent to approximately 8.5% of the area of cereals grown in 389 
the UK in the same year (Defra, 2015b). However, this had declined from 676,700 ha in 2013 390 
illustrating that although voluntary action can be achieved at scale its effectiveness may be limited 391 
by the fact that it is non-binding. 392 
 393 
For incentive payments schemes to be effective in mitigating DWPA they must make good use of 394 
their limited financial resources through targeting and sustained rates of scheme participation. 395 
                                                 
17 Although for all purposes over 110,000 farm inspections are made annually (NAO, 2012). 
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Targeting requires that farmers undertake the correct actions in the correct locations for prevailing 396 
water quality problems. Recent revisions to cross-compliance and the CS scheme (Section 6.3) go 397 
some way to address past criticisms that targeting for DWPA largely failed because of weak 398 
incentives for farmers to adopt those measures with the greatest potential to deliver soil and water 399 
protection outcomes, whilst regional priority statements10 inadequately prioritised water quality 400 
protection as compared to landscape heritage and biodiversity conservation (Defra and The Rivers 401 
Trust, 2012). In particular, farmers have rarely considered the payments for DWPA mitigation 402 
measures that require partial or full land retirement in specific locations to be sufficient to offset the 403 
income foregone, particularly as they were able to adopt lower opportunity cost measures that 404 
achieved other environmental objectives (with marginal if any benefit to water protection) to qualify 405 
for the CS scheme18. It is thus important that options for mitigation of DWPA in the CS scheme are 406 
adequately prescribed, prioritised, incentivised and locally varied. CSF capital grants have been 407 
focused on DWPA and competitive for farmers, but their optimal targeting has been hindered by 408 
data deficiencies, uncertainty regarding the nature and severity of water quality problems, and 409 
limits to the time that CSF advisors can spend visiting farms and co-planning optimal measures 410 
(Defra and The Rivers Trust, 2012).  411 
 412 
Sustaining farmer participation relates to incentives and the length of agreements. The CS scheme 413 
offers 5 year agreements for most measures, and 10 year agreements for some ‘Higher Tier’ 414 
measures. Both can be too short to ‘lock’ strategic environmental improvements into the 415 
landscape, but farmers are often reluctant to enter into longer agreements (Smith et al., 2012). UK 416 
and EU budget cycles that sustain funding also operate over 5 and 10 year cycles at most. 417 
England also lacks legal provision for agreements between a landowner and another party which 418 
place long-term restrictions on the use or management of a parcel of land (Law Commission, 2013; 419 
Smith, 2013). The Law Commission recommends introduction of conservation covenants to 420 
provide this instrument (Law Commission, 2014) but this has yet to be enacted (Law Commission, 421 
2016). 422 
 423 
As noted, privately funded PES schemes in England are few and mainly focus on protecting 424 
sources of drinking water. However, their existence and potential growth requires coordination with 425 
public schemes to optimise leverage of environmental benefits, avoid double-funding of measures 426 
and achieve spatial targeting. Similarly, coordination is needed with regulation, voluntary action 427 
programmes and other incentive schemes for habitats and climate change mitigation. Multiple 428 
agencies are involved, e.g.: Environment Agency, Natural England, local authorities, water 429 
companies, and NGOs; each with different priorities and working to different spatial boundaries. 430 
Also two government sponsored partnership programmes – the Catchment-Based Approach19 and 431 
Local Nature20 partnerships - address different environmental objectives and scales of 432 
management.  Coordination between all entities is needed for the mitigation framework for DWPA 433 
to be as effective as possible. For example, data sharing and joint mapping can be a first step in 434 
condition and threat assessment for water bodies, leading to better aligned plans for a multi-435 
functional landscape. Multi-stakeholder partnerships offer a means for local knowledge to inform 436 
CS scheme priorities but to date there has been little dialogue and synergy between these 437 
processes21. Hence, the potential benefits of participation by stakeholders are not being fully 438 
captured (despite the prescriptions of Article 14 of the EU WFD; information from key informants). 439 
 440 
                                                 
18 Similarly, it is currently anticipated that under ‘greening rules’ qualifying EFAs can be established very 
flexibly on farm holdings and hence are unlikely to be well targeted to protect water resources. 
19 Multi-stakeholder Catchment Partnerships for each of 83 catchments in England, tasked to generate an 
understanding of the water quality issues in each catchment and involve local communities in decision-
making on solutions (Defra, 2013c).   
20 Partnerships of local organisations, businesses and people that aim to improve their local natural 
environment (Defra, 2012). 
21 However, some public consultation mechanisms were used to inform design of the CS scheme. 
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Inter-agency coordination is also important in relation to advice provision. The diverse, 441 
decentralised and privately driven advice sector that has evolved in England has strengths and 442 
weaknesses (Sutherland et al., 2013). Pluralistic providers supply choice, flexibility, competition, 443 
reduced public cost and perhaps efficiency to a heterogeneous farming sector (Garforth et al., 444 
2003), and farmers who know what they want can access information from competent actors 445 
(Knierim and Prager, 2015). However, fragmentation, a lack of coordination and short term 446 
relationships between advisers and farmers may lead to inconsistent messages, duplication and 447 
gaps in provision, and consequently to confusion and message fatigue for farmers (AIC, 2013), 448 
and to loss of trust in the adviser from farmers (Sutherland, et al., 2013).  449 
 450 
7. The mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture in China and its 451 
effectiveness 452 
 453 
7.1 Regulation 454 
 455 
China lacks farm-level regulation and enforcement for mitigation of DWPA comparable to that in 456 
England. This is inevitable given the number and size of farms and the history of their role in 457 
economic development. However, the proportion of land farmed in larger units is rapidly increasing 458 
through land ‘transfer’22 (Huang et al., 2012), and central government is strengthening higher level 459 
regulations, monitoring and enforcement to address environmental degradation. For example, 460 
stricter penalties for enterprises polluting water resources and updated national water quality 461 
standards were introduced by the 2008 Water Pollution Law. The Ministry of Environmental 462 
Protection and the Ministry of Water Resources have also enhanced their discharge and water 463 
quality monitoring, although their spatial coverage remains relatively sparse. However, ‘top-down’ 464 
regulatory intent is widely ‘decoupled’ from ability for implementation and enforcement (Marquis et 465 
al., 2011; Wang and Wang, 2011). For mitigation of DWPA this is caused by multiple multi-level 466 
factors (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Among these is a lack of sufficiently well-defined regulations 467 
for management of soils, animal wastes and fertilisers. Central government and provinces produce 468 
guidelines (e.g. ECEGP, 2015) but these remain advisory and non-enforceable. Regulation and 469 
oversight of quality control in the manufacture of chemical fertilizers is also lacking (Li et al., 2013). 470 
Similarly in most areas there is a lack of regulations for livestock waste treatment, storage and 471 
disposal, utilization of manures, carrying capacity of land and need for riparian buffer zones (Sun et 472 
al., 2012; Li et al., 2013). For the environmental laws that do exist enforcement is inconsistent 473 
across regions and penalties are usually insufficient to ensure compliance; hence reinforced by a 474 
continuing growth-first mentality the judicial system remains largely “incapable of providing robust 475 
protection of environmental rights against abuses” (Wang and Wang, 2011, p.169).  476 
 477 
7.2 Incentive payments 478 
 479 
A variety of ‘eco-compensation’ programmes exist, but lesson drawing from these is weak across 480 
regions and sectors (Bennett, 2009; Zhen and Zhang, 2011), let alone internationally. Most 481 
concern provision of watershed ecosystem services from land use change in upper catchments. 482 
Compensation payments in cash and/or grain are made to farmers who take land out of crop 483 
production, with the aims of reducing deforestation, soil erosion and rural poverty rather than 484 
DWPA per se. Nonetheless leading schemes provide relevant experience and some evidence of 485 
success; for example, the Sloping Land Conversion Programme (SLCP; Xu et al., 2004a) and 486 
Grain for Green Programme (GGP; Cao et al. 2009). More water focused is the Paddy Land-to-Dry 487 
Land (PLDL) programme that aims to protect water quality and quantity for the Miyun reservoir that 488 
serves Beijing, and under which farmers are paid to convert their fields from flooded rice to dryland 489 
cropping (most opting to grow maize), reducing water consumption, and fertilizer and sediment 490 
runoff (Zheng et al., 2013). Under the SLCP at least 60 million rural households committed over 7 491 
million ha of cropland to conversion (Xu at al, 2006) and outcomes in Yunnan Province for 492 
                                                 




example, were relatively well accepted by all stakeholders in terms of environmental and 493 
distributive justice (He and Sikor, 2015). For the GGP total vegetation cover in areas covered by 494 
the project in northern Shaanxi Province increased from almost 30% in 1998 to 42% in 2005 (Cao 495 
et al, 2009). Under the PLDL households upstream of the reservoir converted all of their rice fields 496 
with corresponding improvements in water quantity and quality and an aggregate benefit-cost ratio 497 
for the programme of 1.5 (Zheng et al., 2013).  498 
 499 
Other scheme outcomes are mixed. Land targeting has sometimes been poor, inappropriate 500 
afforestation has reduced soil moisture and the water table, and excessive shading from trees has 501 
hindered ground cover increasing the risk of soil erosion and affecting biodiversity (Cao et al, 2009; 502 
Xu at al, 2006). Programme cost effectiveness has been questioned: in some areas compensation 503 
payments may have been higher that necessary to incentivise farmers; in others benefits of 504 
change to farmers have been marginal and re-conversion to prior cropping was expected once 505 
compensation phased out (Xu et al., 2004b; Xu et al, 2006; Xiaoyun et al., 2006; Bennett, 2009; 506 
Zhen and Zhang, 2011). Farmers and other stakeholders have also not been involved sufficiently 507 
in scheme design and selection of plots for conversion, contributing to sub-optimal programme 508 
delivery (Xiaoyun et al., 2006). 509 
 510 
7.3 Advice provision, voluntary action and knowledge base 511 
 512 
The scope for voluntary action by farmers to mitigate DWPA in China is limited in many arable and 513 
horticultural systems by field and farm size, income levels, prevailing knowledge, attitudes and 514 
practices (in part age and gender related), and increasingly by labour constraints (Smith and 515 
Siciliano, 2015; Smith et al., 2015b). There is more scope in confined animal feeding operations 516 
(CAFOs) and emerging large farms, but most farm decision making remains driven by an ethos to 517 
maximise food production and economic growth (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). A culture of 518 
environmental stewardship by farmers or NGOs that could promote this barely exist. There is, 519 
however, great potential to improve the efficiency of farming practice whilst maintaining productivity 520 
and reducing risk to the environment. For example, management of soils, manures, chemical 521 
fertilizer and irrigation could all be improved to more closely match crop requirements and reduce 522 
risk of losses to air and water (e.g. Chen et al., 2014; Powlson et al., 2014). This emphasises AKIS 523 
and their ability to change farmer behaviour through advice, training and access to technologies. 524 
Dominated by the PAES to date, AKIS in China are currently in an uncertain transition towards the 525 
more diverse, liberalised and networked systems observable in most developed economies (Smith 526 
at al., 2015b). 527 
 528 
As it is large in terms of staffing and number of township ‘stations’, in the ‘absence’ of regulation 529 
and incentive schemes (Sections 7.1 and 7.2), the PAES is the leading public resource available 530 
for mitigation of DWPA. This presents both an obstacle and an opportunity. An obstacle if people, 531 
procedures and institutions are not oriented to address environmental protection and are resistant 532 
to change, but an opportunity in terms of the human and physical capacity that exists. Hence 533 
current attempts to mitigate DWPA in China must focus in large part on the capabilities of the 534 
PAES. However, many observers are critical of its status and performance. They note: low 535 
responsiveness to community and farmer needs despite strong demand for new technologies; 536 
insufficient attention to market access, information provision and information technology in remote 537 
areas; functional specialisation and ‘silo-working’ at Ministerial, provincial, municipal and county 538 
levels (even though at township level a single station usually implements all extension activities; 539 
Huan et al., 2010); fragmentation of stakeholders, each with varying roles, knowledge, objectives 540 
and policy instruments; and lack of coordination and scientific consensus between the PAES and 541 
universities and research institutes despite their growing role in technology development and 542 
transfer (Ma et al., 2013). The PAES exhibits an interventionist approach to agricultural 543 
modernisation based on integration of research, education and extension under the Ministry of 544 
Agriculture, and a linear model of technology transfer (from scientists to the users) (Hu et al., 545 




In each of the four locations visited in China (Section 2), informed by workshops with local 548 
stakeholders, the PAES was observed to be capable of disseminating information but farmers were 549 
passive recipients of recommendations with little formalized opportunity to feedback priorities and 550 
needs. Farmers surveyed often reported greater trust in neighbours and relatives than in PAES 551 
technicians (Smith, et al., 2015b). Efficiency in use of natural resources and environmental 552 
protection remain low priorities in rural areas (Smith and Siciliano, 2015) and the PAES remains 553 
strongly focused on productivity, hindering development of a coherent strategy to balance this with 554 
environmental protection. For DWPA, lacking relevant regulation and publicly available data for 555 
ground and surface water quality23, there were no ‘reference levels’ against which to set advice 556 
and training, or evaluate achievement. Similarly, relevant research is fragmented, lacks 557 
coordination and is not being compiled in the form of an accessible knowledge base for use by the 558 
PAES and wider AKIS. At local level the education level of extension agents is relatively low, they 559 
lack well-adapted ‘messages’ for mitigation of DWPA and training in modern communication 560 
methods. Overall the functional divisions and failures of PAES performance indicate that current 561 
provision is poorly equipped to meet the needs for horizontal coordination of all AKIS actors 562 
(including innovation by and feedback from farmers), and for integrated assessment, design and 563 
implementation of measures for mitigation of DWPA. However, at village and township level 564 
functions and approaches are more integrated, and despite technical capacity limitations, there 565 
may be some scope for the emergence of a more holistic approach (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). 566 
There are thus many deficiencies in the knowledgebase base needed to support the mitigation of 567 
DWPA. Universities and research institutes need to be faced with applied questions and problems 568 
delivered from the farmers and other stakeholders in order to carry out and communicate the most 569 
relevant research (Rahn, 2013); yet incentives for researchers inevitably favour high impact journal 570 
publications over knowledge transfer to farmers, whilst the Ministry of Education in China lacks 571 
bureaucratic alignment24 with the Ministries of Environmental Protection and Agriculture. 572 
 573 
7.4 Other policies 574 
 575 
As in England, WQT and pollution taxes are not active policies in China, and scope for reduction of 576 
perverse incentives from agricultural support policies is limited. Such policies include direct 577 
payments for grain production, a general subsidy for agricultural inputs, a subsidy for adoption of 578 
improved crop varieties, a farm machinery purchase subsidy, minimum grain purchasing prices, 579 
temporary storage options and some environmental protection measures (Ni, 2013). Although in 580 
aggregate the level, number and scope of farm support policies has risen, the value of support per 581 
capita and farm household remains relatively low. There are regional differences but farmers 582 
typically gain 5-6% of their income from support policies, much less than in most developed 583 
economies (OECD, 2011; Ni, 2013). Although potentially fungible, most support can also be 584 
considered decoupled from production decisions (Chen, 2011; Ni, 2013; Huang, 2014). It may also 585 
modestly inhibit more rapid transition to larger farms that have more potential for regulation, advice 586 
provision and capacity for environmental protection measures (Smith and Siciliano, 2015); 587 
although the need to address rural poverty and manage rural-urban transitions must be 588 
recognised. 589 
 590 
In contrast to England where world market determined prices limit demand for fertilizer, the 591 
fertilizer sector in China merits reform. A policy of price caps was removed in 2009 but import tariff 592 
reductions are still used to mitigate domestic shortages and four subsidy programmes remain25 (Li 593 
                                                 
23 For example, it was reported during a workshop in Huantai County that groundwater quality monitoring is 
the responsibility of the Provincial Environment Department and that data is not accessible to the County 
Agricultural Bureau. 
24“…the extent to which the structure of the government allows national development strategies and policies 
to be consistently and effectively implemented” (Marquis et al., 2011, p. 41). 
25 Exemption from electricity price increases for manufacturing plants; exemptions from price increases and 
certain charges for rail transport costs; exemption from value added tax; and a credit subsidy for enterprises 
providing six months storage of fertilizer as a reserve to stabilize supply (Li et al., 2013). 
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et al., 2013). Together with the general farm input subsidy these industry subsidies provided USD 594 
18.76 billion to the sector in 2010 (Li et al., 2013). This contributes to inefficient manufacturing, 595 
variable quality and relatively low prices. For example, since the 1970s, farmers have paid 50 to 596 
75% less for urea fertilizer than the world market price (Li et al., 2013). This induces excessive and 597 
poorly managed use by farmers and thus to DWPA (Sun et al., 2012; Li et al., 2013). 598 
 599 
8. The potential for lesson drawing for mitigation of diffuse water pollution from agriculture 600 
in China 601 
 602 
No elements of the mitigation framework for DWPA present in England are completely absent from 603 
China and lesson drawing must consider what can be better developed rather than what could 604 
commence. Table 3 attempts a first high level assessment of the questions and indicators from 605 
Table 1 (this could be broken down into more detail for specific policy components).    606 
 607 
position - Table 3: Assessment of lesson drawing for mitigation of diffuse water pollution 608 
from agriculture in China 609 
 610 
With regard to regulation there is growing public demand for improvements in environmental 611 
quality in China (e.g. Economist, 2014), although the advocacy role of civil society is limited by the 612 
political restrictions placed on the activities of non-governmental actors. Central pronouncements 613 
signal the aim of ‘green development’ (protecting the environment and pursuing environmentally 614 
friendly economic growth; 13th Five Year Plan, 2016-2020), but China remains some way from 615 
regulating a ‘reference level’ of good practice in relation to DWPA in its diverse farming systems. 616 
This generic aim can be usefully drawn from Figure 2 and international examples, but the actual 617 
regulatory regime must be unique to Chinese conditions. Regulation of the farming sector is not yet 618 
highly politicised and any resistance may be low and lack organisation, but small farm scales and 619 
incomes may limit the compliance-related costs that can be imposed before many remaining 620 
smallholders are forced out of markets (FORHEAD, 2014).  621 
 622 
Other leading constraints to better farm regulation are institutional density, communication, data 623 
sharing and coordination gaps across agencies (including Ministries), the diversity of China’s 624 
physical geography and farming systems, available resources for monitoring and enforcement, and 625 
the sheer number of small farms. For example, regulations issued by central and provincial 626 
governments are monitored and enforced by local governments that tend to prioritise production 627 
and growth (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Varied and partly overlapping responsibilities for regulating 628 
soil and water quality are spread across the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of 629 
Land Resources, the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture (World Bank, 630 
2006; FORHEAD, 2014). Local conditions are often not well addressed by the poor functionality 631 
and lack of specificity of much environmental regulation (Wang and Wang, 2011); a lack of clarity 632 
in definition of rights and responsibilities leaving transposition to guidelines and enforcement at the 633 
discretion of local authorities (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Constraints to publication and sharing of 634 
data are barriers to improvement in agency cooperation (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Meta-data, 635 
sampling methods, and other strengths and weaknesses of different data sets are rarely made 636 
accessible to non-expert users or even expert users in other agencies and Ministries; in fact 637 
experts are often simply unaware of the data available outside their own organisation (FORHEAD, 638 
2014). Public participation remains limited to a passive role of ‘information provider’ without 639 
effective influence on agency performance evaluation and decision making (Burns and Zhou, 640 
2010).  641 
 642 
Central policy has provided the impetus and framework for incentive payments schemes in China 643 
(Bennett, 2009), but the PLDL programme is indicative that demand for this approach may grow, at 644 
least among municipalities seeking to protect their water supply. Growing leisure activity and 645 
tourism, as provided for example by Lake Tai, also increasingly provide drivers and potential 646 
financial resources for protection of water quality. Resistance to schemes may be low but 647 
weaknesses in the design and implementation of past schemes need to be avoided. Wide 648 
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application of something like the CS scheme in England may be constrained by a lack of 649 
ideological consensus. Key tenets of Figure 2 – e.g. the ‘polluter pays principle’, a ‘reference level’ 650 
for farming practice, and targeting of incentive payments – may not yet be shared and accepted by 651 
a majority of stakeholders in China. Schemes need to be well adapted to Chinese conditions, 652 
locally varied (Zheng et al., 2013), and innovative in institutional arrangements to overcome 653 
resource constraints and resolve regional administrative and property rights issues over cross-654 
boundary ecosystem service provision (Bennett, 2009). To be significant in mitigating DWPA at 655 
national scale, schemes may need to be developed for large areas and for large numbers of farms.   656 
 657 
Table 3 suggests that there are fewer constraints to drawing lessons from international experience 658 
to improve the effectiveness of advice provision and voluntary action in mitigation of DWPA. The 659 
PAES is relatively well resourced and has a clear and hierarchical institutional structure. There is 660 
potential to reform its priorities, ethos and modes of working to promote environmental protection 661 
alongside productivity in farming. It also has the potential to coordinate and quality assure other 662 
actors’ activities within the increasing diverse AKIS developing in China. Workshops and field visits 663 
revealed, however, that this will require significant reorientation and training for staff and managers 664 
at all levels. They also revealed that the trust held by farmers in the PAES needs improvement, 665 
and hence lessons can be learnt from adviser accreditation schemes such as the FACTS in the 666 
UK. In comparison to England, it is also notable that China lacks the NGOs that have played a key 667 
role in mediation between state and farmers and in advice provision for mitigation of DWPA. There 668 
is also scope for lesson drawing to inform efforts to improve the knowledgebase for mitigation of 669 
DWPA in China. In England, information resources in the form of manuals and databases, 670 
experience of public participation, the demonstration test catchment programme and catchment 671 
modelling methods all provide examples to inform efforts in China seeking to apply its growing 672 
research outputs in coherent support of environmental protection policy. 673 
 674 
9. Conclusions: a mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture for 675 
China 676 
 677 
Drawing on Figure 2, Table 3 and analysis above, a focus on three policy approaches to mitigate 678 
DWPA in China can be recommended. First is the need for targeted regulation of specific farm 679 
units. Laws are already in place to control DWPA but transposition of these into binding regulations 680 
at a provincial and local level is weak, whilst monitoring and enforcement is difficult to achieve 681 
given the vast number of farms and characteristics of DWPA. Although the Ministry of 682 
Environmental Protection is leading actions to improve the national monitoring system for ecology 683 
and environment by 2020, resources for monitoring and enforcement remain limited and some 684 
targeting is required. For example, experience in England and the wider EU suggests that, given 685 
their relatively small number yet high potential to cause significant pollution loads, intensive 686 
livestock units (e.g. pork and poultry production) can be effectively targeted with regulation. China 687 
already has regulations which apply to the livestock sector and it is suggested that steps are taken 688 
to ensure these regulations are well-focused on mitigation of DWPA and are adequately enforced.  689 
Effective enforcement should be possible given the relatively small number of large livestock 690 
rearing units when compared to the total number of farms in China as a whole. In contrast, given 691 
limitations for their enforcement, manure and chemical fertiliser management regulations for arable 692 
crops are best left as guidelines and addressed through a voluntary and advisory approach 693 
developed by the PAES and its AKIS partners. However, as land transfer continues at a pace 694 
appropriate to local conditions and an increasingly dualistic structure of farming develops there can 695 
be ambition to develop a reference level of enforceable regulation for all large commercial farms. 696 
 697 
Second, targeted incentive payment schemes can be used strategically to protect water resources 698 
from DWPA. Payments would be offered to farmers in designated locations, for example, 699 
vulnerable land adjacent to watercourses or in recharge zones of aquifers used for water supply. 700 
Payment would facilitate conversion of land out of intensive agricultural production to low intensity 701 
farming or other land use with lower risk of pollutant emissions. Although China has considerable 702 
experience there is scope for lesson drawing for the modalities of such schemes from England and 703 
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other countries. For example, transfer of methods to ensure cost effectiveness such as spatial risk 704 
mapping and modelling to identify land within a river basin with the most potential to buffer water 705 
resources from DWPA. Such zones often occupy land that is marginal for food production (and 706 
increasingly for mechanisation given growing labour constraints in some farming systems). Hence 707 
impacts on food security may be acceptable, and payment rates relatively affordable if based on 708 
opportunity costs of production foregone (cognisant of rural income concerns or resettlement 709 
needs). For example, the SLCP only reduced grain supply by 2-3% in the upper reaches of the 710 
Yangtze and Yellow Rivers (Feng et al., 2005). International lesson drawing may also inform 711 
payment regimes that ensure long-term land use change and prevent reversion. For this, payments 712 
need to be sustained over a sufficient time frame to enable farmers to obtain alternative income 713 
streams or resettle in different zones (migrants will require transitional support for successful 714 
resettlement). Objective and transparent approaches are needed to help reduce potential disputes 715 
between local governments over assessment methods and compensation rates.  716 
 717 
Third, a relatively well resourced PAES exists to help farmers maintain and increase agricultural 718 
productivity which can be re-oriented and re-skilled for environmental protection. There are weaker 719 
constraints to lesson drawing from abroad to inform this. The need is to rebalance the importance 720 
of productivity alongside the stewardship of farm inputs, natural resources and wider environmental 721 
protection. Farm advice should emphasize resource use efficiency, profit maximisation and 722 
environmental protection alongside the goal of high productivity. It should increasingly address 723 
farms as businesses, looking beyond yields to the objectives of the business and management of 724 
costs, labour use, crop residues and animal wastes, marketing and supply chains and 725 
environmental impacts. Advice and training modes should become more differentiated by farm 726 
size, management type and cropping system. Similarly, a greater diversity of communication and 727 
education methods should be employed, matched to the needs and access of different farmer 728 
types, and also targeting wider public awareness of environmental quality and food safety. The 729 
PAES is a key resource for delivery, but also for coordination and quality control of other AKIS 730 
actors. Farm advice needs to be coordinated and consistent with DWPA mitigation strategies for 731 
defined farm types, cropping systems and areas; even if that advice is delivered in future via 732 
multiple public and private sector pathways. The advice and continuing research needs to be 733 
tailored to farmers’ needs and informed by their participation and a two-way dialogue. Closer inter-734 
agency working, with improved communication and data sharing at all levels, are required to 735 
develop the new ethos and overcome barriers to coordination created by functional divisions and 736 
specialisations. A major challenge is that this re-orientation is needed from the highest levels of the 737 
Ministry of Agriculture and across staff and managers in regional and local government. 738 
 739 
Support should be given to emerging farmer associations and cooperatives, whilst large agro-740 
enterprises should be well-regulated but also assisted and utilised as demonstrations of best 741 
practice. Amalgamation of farms through land transfer offers growing efficiencies of scope and 742 
scale for provision of advice and technology transfer (also for implementation of incentive 743 
payments schemes). In England experienced and innovative farmers are part of the AKIS and a 744 
resource to be used for environmental protection. Small farmers in China are experienced but often 745 
ageing and poorly educated. However, a cadre of skilled managers of larger agro-enterprises is 746 
growing rapidly and provides a potential resource for innovation, practice and demonstration in 747 
pursuit of environmental protection. To support and facilitate each of the three approaches 748 
identified here, investment is needed in applied research to build an accessible knowledgebase. 749 
Citing leading examples, this knowledgebase must span from methods for public participation, 750 
through design and costing of farm best management practices and design of institutional 751 
mechanisms for incentive payments, to estimation of modelling coefficients empirically derived for 752 
conditions in China. 753 
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Figure 1: Stages of lesson drawing. 1089 
 1090 
Source: Benson, 2009. 1091 
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Table 1: Constraints to lesson drawing  1093 
Constraints  Key questions Indicators 
   
Demand side constraints:   
Policy demand Is there demand for the policy or 
programme? 
High/low demand 
Policy resistance Is there potential resistance to lesson 
drawing and policy change? 
High/low resistance 
   
Context/jurisdiction constraints: 
Path dependency Are past policies restrictive or 
enabling? 
High/low path dependency 
Existing structures Are existing structures restrictive or 
enabling? 
High/low structural density 
Political context Is politicisation apparent? High/low politicisation 
Resources Are resources adequate to support 
transfer in the receiving context? 
Inadequate/adequate 
resources 
Ideological consensus Is there ideological consistency or 
divergence? 
Divergence/consistency 
   
Application constraints: 
Programmatic uniqueness How unique is the policy? Unique/generic 
Programmatic complexity How complex is the policy? High/low complexity 
Institutional comparability Will new institutions be needed? Disabling/enabling institutional 
conditions 
Scale of change What scale of change is anticipated? Large/small scale change 
Programmatic modification Are policy/programme adjustments 
needed? 
High/low programme 
adjustment needed for transfer 
Source: adapted from Benson 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000. 1094 
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Figure 2: A mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture  1096 
 1097 
 1098 
Source:  1099 
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Table 2: Farm inspections in England relevant to mitigation of diffuse water 
pollution from agriculture, 2011-2012 
Agency  Purpose Number of 
inspections 
























1,700: 1% of the 
claimants at 
minimum  
20% - 25% 
selected by 
random, 
others by risk 
moderate to good 
(referring participation 










2,500: 5% of 
beneficiaries within 
5 years of 
agreement and 
2.5% of those over 5 
years at minimum 
20% - 25% 
selected at 
random, 
others by risk 
good where based on 
past performance in the 
scheme 
Source: Defra, 2013b 
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Table 3: Assessment of lesson drawing for mitigation of diffuse water pollution from 1103 
agriculture in China 1104 
 Policy approaches 
Constraints to lesson 
drawing  
Regulation Incentive payments Advice provision/ 
voluntary action 
Policy demand Growing demand Low but protection of 
water for drinking 
supplies and leisure 
activity becoming a 
driver. 
Lacks articulation from 
the top-down; weak 
from the bottom-up.  
Policy resistance Low Low Low to moderate 
Path dependency Low Moderate Low to moderate  
Existing structures High structural density High structural density Low structural density 
Political context Low politicisation Moderate politicisation Low politicisation 
Resources Resources inadequate Inadequate beyond 
water supply zones 
Resources adequate 
Ideological consensus Moderate consistency Moderate consistency Consistent 
Programmatic 
uniqueness 
Generic purpose but 
unique in detail. 
Unique programmes Generic purpose but 
unique in detail. 
Programmatic 
complexity 
High  High Moderate 
Institutional 
comparability 
Disabling Disabling Disabling 
Scales of change Potentially large in 
scale. 
Moderate to large Small 
Programmatic 
modification 
Relatively low for 
generic purpose, but 
high for detail. 
Relatively high Manageable and 
iterative. 
 1105 
